INTRODUCTION
Could it be that the 1 picture of human agency presupposed by law is wrong? If it is, what does that say about the way we use law to justify everything from punishment to civil damages? These are some of the questions taken up by Peter Alces in this provocative and accessible book. Alces pulls no punches in making his case for a thoroughly materialist view of human nature.
2 Persons are nothing more than biological machines. Every human action is the result of physical causes. Free will is an illusion. As for responsibility, Alces is clear: 'Human agents are not morally responsible' (p. 210). 3 The law presupposes a conception of human agency grounded in folk psychology, that is, the everyday terminology we use to describe our thoughts, actions, and emotions. 4 According to Alces, the law 'misunderstands what it means to be human' (p. xiii). Folk psychology is 'illusory' (p. 171), 'incoherent' (p. 35), and 'fallacious' (p. 100). Brain science will 'reshape what we understand to be the meaning of being human' (p. 3) and, when it does, 'then that same brain science will reshape our law, from 1 Thanks to Peter Hacker, Michael Pardo and Stephen Morse for comments on a draft of this review. Thanks also to my research assistant, Erica Camodeca. 2 Alces repeatedly claims that materialism is 'disruptive' to our presuppositions about what it means to be human (p. xii). The consequence is that 'legal doctrine misunderstands what it means to be human' (Ibid.). 3 The book opens with this paragraph: This book is, essentially, a thought experiment: What should law be in order to govern the affairs of human agents who do not have moral responsibility? It proceeds from the premise that human agents do not, in fact, have moral responsibility and that the mechanical nature of human agency is confirmed by neuroscientific insights that have revealed-albeit so far incompletely, perhaps even only vaguely-the chemical, electrical, and structural incidents of neural processes of the brain. And we are no more than our brains; we could not be. That conclusion entails hard determinism, the realization that we are the product of forces. Indeed, we cannot even say 'the product of forces acting upon us' because we are the sum of the forces, not the object of their action (p. xiii). 4 Alces describes folk psychology thus: 'Folk psychology refers to what we engage in every moment of every day when we draw inferences about the thoughts and intentions of others from what we imagine to be going on in their minds' (p. 7).
C The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law, Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com the moral foundations up' (p. 3). Human agency is 'nothing more than physical reactions' (p. 6). In an analogy used several times in his book, Alces likens blaming humans for their actions to blaming a car for not starting (p. 8). Humans, like the cars they drive, are purely mechanical devices that occasionally require repair but benefit not at all from praise or blame. The structure of Alces' book is clean and crisp. The law, he argues, presupposes a conception of human nature that is at odds with neurological, chemical, and biological facts about persons. Folk psychology, the law's conception of human nature, is bankrupt. The law must proceed from the correct view of human nature, that is, one that is thoroughly material and mechanical. Once we realize that the law's picture of human nature is thoroughly without merit, we will quickly see that much legal doctrine makes no sense. After advancing his account of human nature, Alces looks at criminal law, tort law, and contract law for evidence that folk psychology leads us astray. He suggests ways in which each of these three areas of the law can be reformed in the light of the truth about human nature. The book's final chapter is a seriatim indictment of all those 'meek compatibilists [who are] unable to come to terms with the consequences of hard determinism for conceptions of moral responsibility' (p. 236).
Alces' book is the strongest statement yet from those who argue for the view that the mind is the brain and we are just our brain. 5 Advocates of the materialist and reductionist persuasion sometimes suffer from what Stephen Morse has described as 'Brain Overclaim Syndrome'. 6 As this review will detail, Professor Alces seems to suffer more than most. In his eagerness to convince the reader of his mechanistic view of humanity, Alces fails to marshall the facts and arguments needed to sustain even his milder claims. The reason for this is quite simple: neuroscience simply has not progressed to the point where it can even tell us how the brain enables the mind.
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This is not the first book that attempts to reconceive a field in the image of neuroscience. Prior efforts to reconceptualize disciplines as diverse as aesthetics, 8 morality, 9 poetry, 10 and even food and wine 11 have been widely discussed. Some of these efforts have run afoul of basic philosophical errors which cripple their analysis. Several of these same errors are found in Professor Alces' book and we shall consider their implications for his position.
This review proceeds in five parts. I begin with a survey of the philosophical presuppositions of Alces' view of human agency. With that position in view, I then proceed through his treatment of the implications of this perspective in criminal law, tort law, and contract law. I conclude with some remarks on the book under review and the prospects for future work in law and neuroscience.
PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS
Law, Alces asserts, 'depends on a gross misunderstanding of its subject-the human agent' (p. xiii). Even worse, legal doctrine-the substantive rules of law-is grounded on a fallacious conception of human nature. If, as Alces insists, 'brain science reshapes what we understand to be the meaning of being human, then that same brain science must reshape our law, from the moral foundations up' (p. 3). Law proceeds from the perspective of folk psychology which must be replaced by '[c]ognitive neuroscience [which] seeks to identify the physical cause of the actor's behavior ...' (p. 9).
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The law, Alces avers, presupposes free will. From this, law imposes responsibility for action on agents who are always in a position of choice with regard to action. This 'normative philosophy built on free will is incoherent' (p. 35). Contrary to the presuppositions of law, 'neuroscience demonstrates the essentially mechanical (chemical, electrical, and structural) nature of our human agency' (p. 35). Free will is 'a failed hypothesis (although it may make for an entertaining, or at least occasionally comforting, theology)' (p. 35). Human nature is not as law would have it. The correct philosophy of action is not free will and responsibility. Rather, it is a 'materialistic, physicalist' (p. 35) approach, one that understands human action as 'resolutely deterministic' (p. 35).
Alces makes two broad theoretical claims. The claims are different but he does not seem to realize this. This is important if for no other reason than the fact that different sorts of claims require different types of vindication. First, with respect to materialism-which Alces repeatedly asserts will be 'disruptive'-this is a metaphysical claim. Materialism is the mode in which Alces expresses his view that the mental reduces to the physical. We are, as he says, just machines. Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that concerns itself with the ultimate nature of reality. 13 It is 'a philosophical theory about how the world as a whole is constituted'.
14 Importantly, metaphysical claims 'are not open to scientific confirmation or disconfirmation. If they are to be confirmed or refuted, then it will be by analytical argument'.
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Alces provides no arguments for his materialist metaphysics. None. He consistently fails to distinguish between the empirical results of neuroscience (and other sciences) and the metaphysical view he trumpets. The failure is significant. Alces is not the first to make such a mistake. In discussing the work of French neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux, Colin McGinn explains the significance of such an omission:
12 As yet, cognitive neuroscience is not sufficiently developed such that wholesale replacement of folk psychology is indicated. However, 'until we have a better grasp of the brain science, folk psychology makes sense as a second-best solution' (p. 9). 13 Philosophy matters and Alces fails to see this. Materialism drives the claim 'you are your brain'. This is reductionist through and through. But there are strong reasons to resist materialist reductionism as a philosophical matter. First, there are many things that exist in the world that are not material. Laws, poems, numbers, theorems, games, and theater plays all come to mind. Even an explanation of an event or process is not reducible to the matter out of which the event is made (think of the Eagles winning the Super Bowl). As Bennett and Hacker put it:
[W]e are no more just a collection of cells (nerve cells or otherwise) than a painting is just a collection of pigments or brush strokes, a novel just a collection of words, or a society just a collection of people -although what more there is to a painting than mere pigments is not more pigments, what more there is to a novel than mere words is not more words, and what more there is to a society than mere people is not more people. Neuroscience tells us that rational thought resides in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and that the limbic system, particularly the amygdala, is the site of emotional reaction. The amygdala 'lights up' (in the fMRI sense) when the subject is confronted with phenomena that we understand to evoke an emotion reaction, such as pushing a large person off a bridge and in the path of an oncoming trolley to save the lives of five innocents. Meanwhile, a brain image will demonstrate heightened activation of the dlPFC when the same subject is asked instead to reflect on the decision to throw a switch to divert the same trolley onto a side track, killing one innocent rather than five. Indeed, there must be something different about the two choices -throwing the person versus throwing the switch -that very literally resonates in the brain and is manifest in distinguishable patterns of neural activity. Suppose an overeager brain scientist were to announce the new field of 'neuromathematics,' in which old-fashioned mathematics was to be replaced by studies of the brains of mathematicians. Instead of talking about numbers and geometrical forms, we are to talk only of neurons-this being the scientific way to do mathematics.
r Book review
Our enthusiastic brain scientist has clearly confused two distinct things: the subject matter of mathematical thought-numbers and geometric forms-and the mental acts whereby mathematicians grasp that subject matter. To be sure, when mathematicians think, their brains whir and buzz, but that does not entail that what they think about is their own brain.
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The point is simple. One learns nothing about mathematics, morality, or law by looking in the brain. Assessing computational performance is not a neuronal matter. As the philosopher Timothy Scanlon observes, '[t]here are mathematical standards for answering mathematical questions, scientific standards for answering empirical questions about the physical world, and forms of practical reasoning for answering questions about what we have reason to do.'
19 Alces writes as if virtually all human practices can be reduced to neuronal activity, as if somehow the practice of, say, mathematics is just a matter of what goes on in the brain of mathematicians. This is a very strong and controversial claim for which he provides no arguments.
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With his philosophical framework on the table, Alces proceeds to discuss its implications in three areas of law: criminal law, tort law, and contracts. For each body of law, he devotes a 'Doctrine' chapter and a 'Theory' chapter. The normative commitments of each body of law are surveyed and then subjected to a materialist critique. While there are variations in the arguments, the overall trajectory of each of the chapters is the same: to demonstrate law's untenable presuppositions with respect to human agency. After completing his survey of these three areas of law, Alces finishes with a chapter entitled 'An Age of Realization'. There he systematically goes through six arguments, each of which he designates a 'Strawman'. But first, let us consider the law.
CRIMINAL L AW
Having articulated his philosophical commitments, Alces then moves into the heart of his book, beginning with the treatment of doctrine and theory in criminal law. The essence of the doctrine chapter is captured in this sentence: 'For our purposes, it is sufficient to interrogate, in a general manner, how conceptions of human agency in the current criminal law rely on assumptions that emerging neuroscientific insights could undermine' (p. 41). Responsibility, free will, and human agency are the central notions.
The criminal law doctrine chapter begins with a statement the truth of which cannot be doubted:
[T]he criminal law sees issues of moral responsibility and the essence of human agency loom larger than in any other primary doctrinal area. The criminal law assumes that human agents are responsible in a normative sense, an assumption inherent in both noninstrumental and instrumental conceptions of desert. (p. 40)
The strategy of this chapter is 'to interrogate, in a general manner, how conceptions of human agency in the current criminal law rely on assumptions that emerging neuroscientific insights could undermine' (p. 41). Alces' conclusion is that in light of what neuroscience teaches us about human agency, we might well come to the conclusion that existing criminal law doctrine is 'incoherent' (p. 42) or worse.
The chapter has three parts, each of which serves a different argument. First is the criminal law's presupposition of responsibility. If human action really is mechanistic, then responsibility is out of place. Second is cognitive capacity. Alces thinks that criminal law doctrine is insensitive to limitations of cognitive capacity. Finally, and of great interest, are the effects of nature and nurture on behavior. Here Alces relies on empirical studies to bolster his metaphysical claims about materialism and determinism.
Responsibility requires the presence of someone-an 'I'-who is responsible. Alces maintains there is no such I. 'None of our actions is the product of free will' (p. 43), he maintains. And yet, the 'criminal law is committed to the reality of free will' (p. 43). Not only is there no I, there is no entity upon which external forces (eg chemical, neuronal, or environmental) act. The 'I' is simply the site where these forces come together. We are simply machines, just like our automobiles.
Alces is surely correct. That is, if there is no I, no agent capable of choice and merely the products of external forces, then the criminal law is a house of cards. As he puts it: 'if there is no such thing as free will, then there is no normative sense of responsibility' (p. 43). But is there any reason to think that this is the case? Alces answers this question but not immediately. We have to wait for the third argument.
The second argument concerns cognitive capacity. The criminal law makes allowances for defendants suffering from cognitive deficit. Alces draws our attention to the US Sentencing Guidelines 21 and some leading cases 22 in support of his contention. He points out that while the criminal makes graded distinctions among offenders, it lacks the empirical tools one finds in neuroscience. Psychopaths provide a difficult example. Psychopothy is 'a verifiable and very material brain condition' (p. 51). But psychopaths are subject to criminal liability notwithstanding their neurological condition. What is to be done? Alces thinks psychopaths take us to the limits of criminal and constitutional law. In the Minority Report context, where the neurological status of the potential offender is known, the question is 'should the criminal law intervene?' (p. 52). Alces recognizes that current constitutional law would preclude such an intervention but, when the criminal law is revised in the light of further developments in neuroscience, he is more sanguine about the prospects for change in the criminal law.
This takes us to the third and most interesting claim by Alces. He characterizes this set of issues with the moniker 'nature and nurture'. His point is that the effects of nature (eg genes and neuronal condition) as well as environment (eg poor child rearing, abuse, environmental effects) all determine our behavior. This is the empirical portion of Alces' proof that we are nothing more than the product of the forces that parse through our brain and body. Alces explicitly relies on the pioneering research of Adrain Raine. 
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Let us consider Raine's work in detail.
Raine's book The Anatomy of Violence: The Biological Roots of Crime 25 is a major contribution to the field of criminology.
26 Through his own research as well as thoughtful commentary on the work of others, Raine demonstrated that the combination of environmental factors (eg exposure to lead, stability of home environment), child rearing failures (eg pregnancy and birth complications, physical abuse, alcohol and drug use), genetic predisposition and neuronal incapacity (eg concentrations of hormones and neurotransmitters, reduced amygdala volume, prefrontal cortex gray matter volume, hippocampus, and thalamic activity) all contribute to creating a proclivity for antisocial and violent behavior. Interestingly, a singularly accurate characteristic of psychopaths is a low resting heartrate, 27 which is explained by fearlessness and simulation-seeking theories.
As everyone knows, correlation is not causation. Nor is predilection a guarantee of anything. In contrast to Alces, Raine is far more modest in his assessment of the hard determinism one might embrace as a result of his research. On free will, he writes:
Free will likely lies on a continuum, with some people having almost complete choice in their actions, while others have relatively less. Rather than viewing intent in black-andwhite, all-or-nothing terms, as the law does, with a few exceptions, I see shades of gray. Most of us lie between these extremes. Think of the free-will concept like IQ, extraversion, or temperature, which are dimensional in nature. There are degrees of free will, and we all differ on that dimension of agency.
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There is little to disagree with here. Raine has shown that the biosocial interactions of environmental and genetic factors incline some people to engage in antisocial and violent behavior. But, as argued, determinism is not a plausible corollary of this research. Raine himself rejects the all-or-nothing stance taken by Alces. There are degrees of free will and predilection does not mean one's fate is certain. Consider the example of none 24 A smaller instance of hyperbole is Alces' discussion of Roper v Simmons, the US Supreme Court case that mentioned neuroscientific studies of adolescents. Alces claims that in Roper, 'Justice Kennedy took account of neuroscientific insights into adolescent brain development' (p. 60). This is simply not true (and Alces provides no reference to the opinion in support of this claim). The briefs of the parties were filled with references to neuroscientific studies of adolescents but Kennedy did not cite a single one. For a complete discussion of the opinion, see Morse, supra note 6. 25 ADRIAN RAINE, THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CRIME (2013). 26 The book is not without its thoughtful critics. Raymond Tallis wrote the following in a review of the book in the popular UK newspaper, The Telegraph: Raine is sufficiently savvy to know that if you test for enough correlations, something will turn up, particularly if (as often in his line of work) the numbers of subjects are small, rarely checked in repeat studies, and there is a publication bias that favours exciting positive findings over disappointing negative ones. And he knows that correlation does not imply causation: finding differences in the brains of criminals does not mean that the differences explain criminal behaviour. other than Adrian Raine himself: not only does he have a significantly low heart rate, but a brain scan revealed he has the brain structure of a psychopath. 29 Alces' reductive impulse is on display early in the criminal law theory chapter. He writes: 'folk psychology significantly reduces to cognitive neuroscience and so cognitive neuroscience reveals the deficiencies, in the normative sense, of folk psychology' (p. 69). Variously described by Alces as a 'chimera' and 'alchemy', folk psychology is bashed heavily, as it plays such a large role in the structure of the criminal law. Again, materialism will vanquish folk psychology and, with it, criminal law doctrine: 'A thoroughgoing materialism challenges criminal law doctrine, and appreciation of what the perspective entails would profoundly reorder the morality that criminal law instantiates' (p. 73).
As mentioned earlier, Alces provides no arguments in support of his contention that materialism vanquishes folk psychology. He uncharitably characterizes Stephen Morse and Michael Moore as 'apologists for the doctrinal and normative status quo of extant criminal law...' (p. 94). Their sin, as Alces explains, is to employ folk psychology to prop up a conception of responsibility at odds with the truth of materialism. Alces cannot abide this. As he explains, '[f]or the materialist, the criminal doctrine's insistence upon moral responsibility is akin to extracting gold from lead, a remnant of burning witches and punishing epileptics for being possessed by demons' (p. 94).
There can be no moral responsibility if there is no agency as the criminal law conceives it. And criminal law is all wrong about agency because there is no human agency. The law's conception of the person is a fiction. As Alces remarks: '[m]oral responsibility depends on the reality of beliefs, desires, and intents that in turn rely on the supernatural, on our being autonomous gods who can cause without being caused. That is the view that neuroscientific insights challenge' (p. 98).
What are the neuroscientific insights that support such a wholesale condemnation of the presuppositions of the criminal law? Surprisingly, in this chapter, Alces cites no neuroscience research for his claims about moral responsibility. The work of Adrian Raine is referenced at several points in the criminal law theory chapter but there is nothing more. There are at least two reasons why this nod to the work of Raine falls short. First, as argued earlier (and confirmed by Raine himself), proclivity is not destiny. There is a world of difference between an individual possessing violent tendencies and the view that every human action is the product of a mechanism. Second, and more importantly, materialism is a metaphysical view that cannot be confirmed by scientific experiment. To claim otherwise, as Alces does, is a category mistake.
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TORT L AW Tort law lies between criminal law and contract law with the former regulating harm, and the latter governing self-imposed duties that arise out of consent (p. 102). Alces focuses on unintentional torts in Chapter 4, devoted to tort law doctrine. He eschews focus on intentional torts in favor of an analysis of unintentional torts because those 'involve a different state of the brain: negligence' (p. 102). Tort liability is built on a standard of reasonableness. Neuroscience can potentially contribute to the reformation 448 r Book review of tort doctrine through 'a conception of reasonableness informed by empirical reality' (p. 102).
Alces considers three aspects of tort doctrine. First is the standard of care. Here, neuroscience can reveal an uncertainty in the doctrine, as it will reveal 'the absolute incapacity of the parties to act reasonably, notwithstanding doctrinal insistence that we assume capacity or ignore incapacity in fact' (p. 103). Next up for examination is proximate cause. The focus is on just who is the cause of injury? Is it possible that we are 'not ... the proximate cause of what happens in our brains' because, as neuroscience demonstrates, there is no ''we' separate from our brains' (p. 103). Finally, neuroscience can contribute to eliding the distinction between mental and physical injury, for 'all injury is ultimately and fundamentally physical' (p. 103).
In a section entitled 'What Advances in Neuroscience May Reveal', Alces presses a theme seen throughout the book, that is, the idea that advances in neuroscience will directly impact the rethinking of legal doctrine. He asks the question this way: 'If we are all just the product of our unique physical and mental (also necessarily, at some level, physical) characteristics, what do we hope to accomplish by the imposition of tort liability?' (p. 110). Alces leaves the answer to the next chapter, on tort law theory, but he provides a few examples from tort law doctrine that will feel the impact of revision in the light of neuroscientific evidence.
As Alces explains, under tort law, the tortfeasor's actions must be the proximate cause of the victim's injuries. Further, if the victim contributed to her own injury, then the fault of tortfeasor and victim is compared. If each party is equally at fault, then the victim is not entitled to damages. Alces is surely right that, in any particular case, the calculus may be opaque (p. 111). Neuroscience can assist 'by shedding light on whether the plaintiff could have taken steps that would have reduced or eliminated altogether the consequences of the defendant's actions' (p. 111). Addiction provides another example.
Take the case of cigarette smoking. Cigarette manufacturers take full advantage of the brain's proclivity to addiction. If cigarette manufacturers took advantage of this proclivity, should a plaintiff's smoking behavior be deemed a contributing factor to their ill health? As Alces puts it, 'if the plaintiff is not in control of his addiction, if the defendant caused the plaintiff's dependence on the product that damages the plaintiff's health, then is it appropriate to reduce the plaintiff's recovery on account of a variable that the defendant controlled and exploited? ' (pp. 113-14) . This is an excellent question.
Alces thinks the answer to his question lies in an account of 'dualism', which he frames as a conceptual issue. He discusses an argument by David Wallace, 31 a litigator who challenged the notion that 'a plaintiff who proves addiction may recover from cigarette manufacturers' (p. 114). Wallace's argument was simple and straightforward: 'Smoking behavior is not the work of a homunculus in the brain or neuronal circumstances... Brains do not smoke cigarettes; acting people do, and the whole human organism involved. For the same reason, brains are not subject to responsibility attribution; acting people are. Law is about personhood, not biophysical function.' Alces' critique of Wallace's argument is that it is 'dualistic' (p. 114). The assertion 'Brains don't kill people; people kill people' 33 is consistent with 'the disposition of the current tort law doctrine which relies on the very dualism [of] the brain and the person as though the two are separate, distinct in some way pertinent to the normative calculus' (p. 115). While Wallace sees the question as 'who is in charge for responsibility of accountability purposes, the brain or the person', 34 Alces contests the notion that there is a 'person' separate from the brain. He directs his critique at the argument advanced by M.R. Bennett and Peter Hacker in their book Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience. 35 The argument that Bennett and Hacker made is conceptual in nature, relying on the mereological fallacy. 36 The fallacy is committed when one attributes a capacity to a part of an entity that is only attributable to the whole. 37 Consider a simple example, a watch. Suppose someone asked of a watch 'Which part of the watch keeps the time? Is it the face of the watch, the hands, or the internal mechanism?' The correct answer is 'all three'. Together, the components of the watch (or, simply, the watch) keep the time. It is an error, a conceptual error, to claim that a part of a watch keeps the time. To do so is to commit the mereological fallacy.
Alces seems to think that this explanation presupposes 'a separate ousia' (p. 114). Such an explanation, he argues, crosses 'the ontological divide ... by positing that the person who thinks and feels is not the brain that performs those concomitant functions (firing neural synapses, etc.). Personhood is the nonphysical entity linked to the now materially grounded mind. But on what grounds can this person be said to exist if it is a nonphysical entity?' (pp. 114-15, citation omitted) As I hope I have made clear, there is no more reason to think that there is a nonphysical entity (ie a person) than there is reason to think there is a nonphysical watch separate from the functionally integrated components that comprise the thing called a 'watch'. 38 Alces' entire argument regarding 'dualism' misses the mark completely.
Chapter 5 is devoted to neuroscience and tort law theory. Alces correctly notes that the heart of tort law theory is corrective justice. that causes motion in a hand from the part that makes the heart contract. But this will not tell us why we assign one kind of motion and not the other to the agency of the human being as a whole. The key to answering this question is integration, and not the activity of a specific organ . . .'). 39 There is a wealth of literature on tort law from the point of view of economics that Alces does not address. It would have been interesting to have his thoughts on how his account of agency makes sense of an approach like behavioral law and economics. 40 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book 5, Ch. 10 (T. Irwin trans, 2d ed., 1999).
goal of corrective justice is to rectify civil wrongs through an award of damages. In tort law, as the party responsible for loss, it falls to the tortfeasor to compensate the victim in an amount that will make the victim whole. Alces surveys three leading theories of corrective justice as a prelude to taking up the question of agency. The four theorists whose work he considers are Ernest Weinrib, Jules Coleman, John Goldberg, and Ben Zipursky. Weinrib's account of corrective justice proceeds from a sophisticated account of the nature of private law. 41 With an emphasis on the work of Kant, Weinrib has developed the leading alternative to law and economics, the dominant paradigm in tort law. Jules Coleman, also committed to a theory of corrective justice, argued that moral responsibility (ie answering for a wrong) was the conceptual centerpiece of tort law. As such, it presumes 'reliance on responsibility' (p. 152), a notion that is consistently under pressure in the neuroscientific account of agency. Finally, John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky have developed a conception of tort law they refer to as Civil Recourse theory. The centerpiece of their theory is the notion of blameworthiness which, as Alces notes, 'is a constituent of the wrong itself [and] that distinguishes actionable wrongs from wrongs that are not actionable' (p. 158).
Not surprisingly, each theory is rejected because it presumes a form of agency that is vanquished by neuroscience. 42 Thus, Weinrib's view is described as 'incoherent' (p. 143), Coleman's analysis is 'not a model of clarity' (p. 153), and Goldberg/Zipursky are dismissed as purveyors of 'alchemy' (p. 158). This is not the surprising aspect of this chapter. Alces began this chapter with this statement: 'The focus of this chapter ... is to consider the impact of neuroscientific insights on noninstrumental theories of tort' (p. 138). Given that focus, it is surprising that in the course of his critique of the work of leading tort law scholars, Alces cites not a single piece of neuroscientific research in support of his strong claims. What is badly needed is a demonstration of how the neuroscientific conception of agency can both displace and replace our current regime of tort law. Again, it is not that Alces' argument is incorrect, rather, it is that he provides no argument whatsoever. To make his case, he needs to bring neuroscientific research 41 See ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (2012) . 42 Alces at 139-40: 'The conclusion is that corrective justice retains and relies upon a conception of human agents' moral responsibility that is infirm -actually, incoherent.' Alces uses the adjective 'incoherent' quite often to describe views he disagrees with. In point of fact, there is very little, if any, incoherence in the views he attacks. The views of the four tort theorists discussed here are quite coherent (ie they bear all the hallmarks of unity and internal coherence); they simply proceed from different premises than Alces. A view may be incorrect but that does not make it incoherent. Alces seems not to realize this.
to bear on tort law doctrine and theory. 43 Otherwise, he is simply engaged in a questionbegging exercise.
CONTR ACT L AW
As a professor of contract and commercial law, 44 Alces is in complete command of contract doctrine. Consent, Alces argues, is a good place to assess 'the effect that neuroscience may have on contract doctrine. The primary reason for that is the central, defining role played by consent in contract law' (p. 180). In this chapter, Alces promises to bring 'empirical evidence particularly pertinent to contract law' (p. 181) to bear on 'contract law, our enhanced understanding of cognitive function and capacities-more accurate assessments of the nature of human agency when decisions are made and legal obligations voluntarily assumed ...' (p. 181).
Alces reviews two contract/commercial law doctrines to anchor his subsequent analysis of consent. First is the Uniform Commercial Code's Section 2-207, which addresses the so-called Battle of the Forms problem. Section 2-207 was designed to solve the so-called Last Shot problem at common law. Under the common law, where parties exchange forms with different terms, in the absence of explicit consent by one of the parties, if there is 'performance', then the party in the document last sent by one of the parties become the terms of the agreement. What Section 2-207 accomplishes is the production of an agreement out of the conflicting terms of the parties' forms. 45 Consent is, in a sense, 'manufactured' as the terms of the resulting agreement exclusively those of either party.
The second context for consent is in the consumer context. Alces discusses a number of cases, including Hill v Gateway. 46 Hill is an infamous opinion by Frank Easterbrook, wherein Easterbrook decided that consumers could be bound by terms in the box of a computer they had purchased over the internet notwithstanding the fact that they had no access to the terms of the agreement prior to receiving and opening the box upon its arrival. As Alces correctly comments, Easterbrook's conclusion that there was consent to the unseen terms is 'unfathomably opaque' (p. 186).
A finding of 'consent' is a normative judgment. Alces is surely correct about this. As he says, 'consent is more of a conclusion than it is an analytical tool' (p. 187). But that conclusion is shaky when put under the light of neuroscience. 'Neuroscience may reveal that the consent conclusion-which strings together isolated facts to produce a complete constellation that leads to certain outcome-determinative inferences-is an unreliable if not altogether deficient means of performing the normative task that doctrine ought to perform' (p. 187).
Consent can be the object of manipulation. Alces argues that neuroscience can show just how consent is manipulated in ways that legal doctrine presently fails to take account of. His analysis is convincing and is the best example of the promise of 43 In point of fact, Alces does not bring neuroscientific research to bear in most parts of his book. The reason is simple: there is none. Neuroscience is nowhere near where it needs to be to support the claims Alces makes for it. 44 His most recent book in the field is PETER A. ALCES, A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW (2011) . 45 Alces at 183. ('Section 2-207 provides that a contract exists on the terms common to both writings combined with terms supplied by prior practices or accepted trade usage.') 46 Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
452 r Book review neuroscience for law reform. He begins with the pioneering work of Hanson and Yosifon on 'Situationism'. 47 The crux of Situationsim in the contract context is that far from being rational actors, we are captured by our circumstances. We think we are in control but we are not: 'Our experience of will ... is not only an internal illusion, it is an internal illusion that is susceptible to external situational manipulation ...Our point...is that our experience of will-our familiar experience that our will is responsible for our conduct-is often not a reliable indicator of the actual cause of our behavior ...' (Alces at 191, citing and quoting Hanson and Yosifon at 132-33, emphasis in original). 48 Alces heaps scorn on the Restatement's failure to take empirical realities into account. 49 With a nod to the pioneering work of Daniel Kahnemann, 50 Alces argues that neuroscience shows us '[t]here are cognitive processes-chemical, electrical, and structural-that operate and cooperate when agents (human or otherwise) make a decision, but there is nothing fundamentally different about the two that justifies elevating one over the other ' (p. 197) . Understanding 'neural structures and functions' (p. 199) help us to understand that consent can be manipulated. Once we do this, we realize that '[n]euroscience can reinforce limitations on consent and demonstrate that those limitations are not the product of political commitments but instead the product of good science' (p. 201).
If neuroscience could teach us something about manipulation and how it undermines contract doctrine, it would be a useful tool. That is not quite Alces' aspiration. He thinks that consent doctrine actually facilitates manipulation because it presupposes an account of human agency that is at odds with neuronal reality. 51 Alces' aspiration here is noble but it rests on a conceptual error. Neuroscience cannot give us a conception of consent or any other concept. The relationship of the conceptual to the empirical is that one first needs a concept before that concept can be tested. For example, to know whether someone is lying on any particular occasion, we must first have a conception of what it is to tell a lie. 52 Neuroscience won't give us that. In short, normative questions cannot be answered by science, even good science.
Chapter 7, on neuroscience and contract theory, 'applies the neuroscientific template to theories of consent in contract' (p. 202). Alces has philosophy in his sights right from the first paragraph. He writes: 'Philosophical inquiry that proceeds without taking account of the normative limits of human agency could be nothing more than an insubstantial intellectual enterprise, unlikely to describe or prescribe very well at all' (p. 202). The reader has a sense that some sacred theoretical accounts of contract law 53 are about to meet their end. Because most accounts of contract are grounded in the will, they are CONCLUSION Throughout his book, Peter Alces overclaims to a surprising degree. Neuroscience is a rapidly growing but young science. Its primary investigative tool, the fMRI, has substantial technical challenges that, in time, will be overcome. 69 But many of the problems in the field of law and neuroscience are conceptual: we simply don't know how to relate scientific developments to conceptual and legal questions. Much work needs to be done. Alces' book will contribute to the discussion, if only for the force with which his case is made. But enthusiasm is no substitute for clear thinking. The book is a prime example of neuromania.
